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A grand jury indicted Ernest Benjamin Smith ("Smith") for murdering a
clerk during an armed robbery of a grocery store.' The trial judge "informally
ordered the State's attorneyto arrange a psychiatric examination of Smith byDr.
James P. Grigson to determine Smith's competencyto stand trial."2 Dr. Grigson
did not obtain permission from defense counsel to examine Smith prior to the
evaluation.3 After the exam, Dr. Grigson determined that Smith was competent
to stand trial' Smith's attorneys did not seek to present anyevidence concerning
his mental health at trial or during sentencing.' During the sentencing phase of
the trial, the prosecution called Dr. Grigson to testify about Smith's future
dangerousness .6 Except for being aware that the interview had occurred, defense
counsel were given no prior warning that Dr. Grigson would testify. Moreover,
the available reports from Dr. Grigson's evaluation only contained one general
reference to future dangerousness byclassifying Smith as a "severe sociopath."8
Nonetheless, Dr. Grigson testified
(a) that Smith "is a very severe sociopath"; (b) that "he will
continue his previous behavior"; (c) that his sociopathic condi-
tion will "only get worse"; (d) that he has no "regard for an-
other human being's property or for their life, regardless of
* JD. Candidate, May 2004, Washington and Lee University School of Law;, B.A., 2002,
University of Pittsburgh, College of Arts and Sciences. The author would like to thank Professor
Roger D. Groot and the students of the Capital Case (earinghouse- particularly Terrence T.
Egland, Janice L. Kopec, and Priya Nath- for their insights and edits. He would also like to thank
his parents, Christopher and Linda Smith, for their support and inspiration. He would also like to
thank his friends, particularly Angela Florio for her patience and love.
1. Estelle v. Smith, 451 US. 454, 456 (1981).
2. Id at 456-57.
3. Id at 459.
4. Id at 457.
5. Id at 457 n1, 458.
6. Id at 458.
7. Sni, 451 U.S. at 458-59.
8. Id at 458-60.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
who it may be"; (e) that "[t]here is no treatment, no medicine
... that in anyway at all modifies or changes this behavior"; (f)
that he "is going to go ahead and commit other similar or same
criminal acts if given the opportunityto do so"; and (g) that he
"has no remorse or sorrow for what he has done."9
Consequently, the jury found that Smith posed a future danger to society and
returned a verdict of death." Texas law required the court to impose a death
sentence."'
Smith's case illustrates the importance of the questions an accused must
negotiate when faced with the prospect of a court-ordered mental examination
and the potentiallydevastating impact such an examination mayhave on the trial.
The accused must decide whether to attend the examination or to refuse and
therebypotentially forego the opportunityto present psychiatric evidence.' 2 In
making that decision, is the accused entitled to the assistance of counsel? If so,
may counsel actually accompanythe accused to the evaluation? Maythe defen-
dant's own mental health experts attend the examination? If defense counsel or
mental experts are allowed to attend the examination, what role should theyplay
during the evaluation? May the examination be videotaped? From the defen-
dant's perspective, is it even desirable to have the examination videotaped?
Most of these questions have been left unanswered in the Commonwealth
of Virginia. 3 Therefore, this article will examine some of the approaches other
jurisdictions have taken with respect to these issues. It will also suggest which
resolutions to these problems best protect a defendant's constitutional rights,
and it will predict which resolutions Virginia courts might adopt in practice. Part
II of this Article will examine the United States Supreme Court's decision that
a defendant must have the benefit of counsel in deciding whether to submit to
a psychiatric evaluation.14 Part III will explore the constitutional dimensions of
allowing defense counsel to attend psychiatric evaluations. Part IV will discuss
who, if anybody apart from defense counsel, may attend the examination. Part
V will evaluate, from the defense perspective, the desirability of videotaping the
examination. It will also examine the likelihood that a judge would grant a
9. Id at 459-60 (alterations in original.
10. 1d at 460.
11. Id; s& TEx. CRIM. PROC CODE ANN. 5 37.071(g) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (requiring the
judge to sentence the defendant to death if the jury so fixes the sentence).
12. See Snith, 451 U.S. at 465-66 & n. 10 (noting that several courts of appeals have found
that a defendant will not be permitted to present psychiatric testimony if the defendant refused to
submit to the State's psychiatric evaluation).
13. See Tue v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 539, 551-52 (Va. 1984) (holding that the
defendant waived his right to counsel at a psychiatric hearing requested by the defense). Tuge
appears to be as close as the Virginia courts have come to deciding whether defense counsel need
to be present at psychiatric evaluations.
14. Srrb, 451 U.S. at 470.
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request for a videorecording from either party and some alternatives to a video-
recording. Part VI will investigate which examinations, other than an examina-
tion to determine sanity, defense counsel or other members of the defense team
may attend. Part VII will note when evidence from such examinations will be
admissible. Finally, Part VIII will discuss what role defense counsel should play
at the examination.
II Assistaixe jcCmd i DaQdxr 4xdx-rto Subnit toa PsodmtrEuduation
In Estelle v Srith,5 the United States Supreme Court considered the fact
pattern presented in Part I and examined whether a criminal defendant had the
right to consult with his attorney before deciding whether to attend the court-
ordered examination by Dr. Grigson, which was ultimately used to determine
future dangerousness. 6 The Court stated that:
"It is central to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addi-
tion to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that
he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where coun-
sel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."' 7
In other words, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when the
proceedings reach a "critical stage." 8 The Court found that the decision to
submit to the interview with Dr. Grigson was a critical stage, at which the right
to counsel should have attached. 9 The court noted that this right was violated
because Smith's attorneys were not informed that the examination would include
an evaluation of future dangerousness and Smith was therefore denied the
opportunity to consult with his attorneys about whether to consent to the
interview." The Court stated that Smith's decision was inherently difficult
because it required " 'a knowledge of what other evidence is available, of the
particular psythiatrist's biases and predilections, [and] of possible alternative
strategies at the sentencing hearing.' "2 Therefore, the Court decided that the
15. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
16. Srith, 451 U.S. at 469; swspr aPat I (relating the underlying facts of Smith's case).
17. Snaih, 451 U.S. at 470 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 226 (1967)).
18. Id (citing Colemanv. Alabama, 399 US. 1, 7-10 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45,
57 (1932)).
19. Id
20. Id at 470-71.
21. Id at 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir.
1979)).
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defendant should have the assistance of counsel when navigating the eddies of
such a difficult choice.22
It is beyond question that a defendant must be permitted to consult with
counsel before deciding whether to submit to the State's psychiatric evaluation.23
However, Smith did not argue that he had a constitutional right to have his
counsel present at the psychiatric evaluation.24 The Court noted, in an oft-cited
dictum, that:
Respondent does not assert, and the Court of Appeals did not
find, any constitutional right to have counsel actually present
during the examination. In fact, the Court of Appeil recog-
nized that "an attorneypresent during the psychiaiic interview
could contribute little and might seriouslydisrupt the examina-
tion."2"
Therefore, after Srih, the question of whether defense counsel could attend
psychiatric evaluations remained open.
II. The Preee qDfe e Cwd at PsydmmcEvduain
Despite the Court's dictum in Snith, several jurisdictions have found that
criminal defendants do have the right to have their attorneys present at court-
ordered psychiatric evaluations.26 In contrast, other jurisdictions have found that
there is no right to have defense counsel present at court-ordered psychiatric
22. Id
23. See Snith, 451 U.S. at 471 (finding that defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel "in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination and to what
end the psychiatrist's findings could be employed").
24. Id at 470 n.14.
25. Id (quoting Srrib, 602 F.2d at 708).
26. See, eg, WASI- REV. CODE ANN. S 10.77.020(3) (West 2002) (allowing the defendant to
have counsel present at psychiatric evaluations); ALA. F, CRIM. P. 16.2(b)(8) (stating that when the
court orders a psychiatric evaluation "[t]he defendant shall be entitled to the presence of counsel
at the taking of such evidence"); FLA. R. OIM. P. 3.216(d) (permitting attorneys for the State and
the accused to attend a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation in response to the defendant's intent
to raise an insanity defense at tria); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 794-96 (Alaska 1979) (finding
that the Alaska Constitution's guarantee that criminal defendants will enjoy the right to effective
assistance of counsel implied that defendants have the right to have their counsel present at
psychiatric evaluations); Lee v. County Ct., 267 N.E.2d 452, 459 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that defense
counsel should be present at psychiatric evaluations in order to preserve the defendant's right to
counsel and cross-examine adverse witnesses); State v. Mains, 669 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Or. 1983)
(affirming that a defendant has the right to have defense counsel physically present at a court-
ordered psychiatric evaluation); see ao A.B.A. Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.110) (Rev. Ed. 2003) (stating that if the court orders a
psychiatric evaluation, defense counsel should attend the examination). See gefraly Timothy E.
Travers, Annotation, Rig of Awai in Crril Prseaa to Pnunxo Coumd at C -t.ApdnW tor
AppmzedPsydh ?cExanimna2, 3 A.LIR.4TH 910 (1981 &Supp. 2003) (cataloguing cases that have
found defendants have the right to counsel at psychiatric evaluations).
[Vol. 16:2
2004] RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS 425
evaluations, but some of those courts have explicitly stated that the trial court
maypermit defense counsel to attend the examination." Without question, the
most thorough discussion of this issue maybe found in UnitdStateS v Bkes,28 in
which, then-circuit Judge Scalia, joined by then-circuit Judge Ginsburg in a
plurality opinion, stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not
include the right to have defense counsel present at psychiatric evaluations.29
That opinion provoked a lengthy dissent from senior circuit Judge Bazelon, in
which he argued that the Sixth Amendment protections did guarantee an accused
the right to have defense counsel present at psychiatric evaluations.3" This
section willtrace the contours of Judges Scalia and Bazelon's disagreement, while
exploring the manner in which other jurisdictions have resolved the issues
confronted bythe judges.
A. Baog wd
BillyG. Byers ("Byers") was indicted on a charge of first degree murder.31
Byers asserted a defense of insanity and alleged that he killed the victim, his
girlfriend, to break free of a spell he believed she placed on him 2 An initial
examination revealed that Byers was competent to stand trial but probablyinsane
at the time of the offense." A second court-ordered examination indicated that
Byers was not insane. 4 At trial, one of the psychologists from the second
examination recalled a conversation with Byers in which Byers claimed that, after
the killing, his wife suggested the possibility that he was under a magical influ-
27. Sa eg, United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1121-22 (D.C Cir. 1984) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting the appellant's Sixth Amendment claim to have defense counsel present at his
psychiatric evaluations); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726-27 (4th Cr. 1968) (same);
State v. Shackart, 858 P.2d 639, 647 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying
defense counsel's request to be present at the psychiatric examination); People v. Mahaffey, 651
N.E2d 1055, 1064 (Ill 1995) (recognizing valid diagnostic reasons for denying defense counsel's
request to be present at evaluation); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 686 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (Mass.
1997) (reaffirming that the psychiatric evaluation is not a critical stage at which defense counsel
must be present); People v. Martin, 192 N.W.2d 215,226 (ich 1971) (finding defendant had no
absolute right to have counsel present at psychiatric evaluation, but committing the matter to the
trial court's discretion); State v. Whitlow, 210 A.2d 763,776 (N.J. 1963) (same); State v. Martin, 950
S.W2d 20, 27 (Tenn. 1997) (finding neither the United States nor the Tennessee Constitutions
conferred the right to have counsel present at psychiatric evaluations of defendant). Sw raly
Travers, supra note 26 (isting cases that have held defendants have no right to counsel at psychiatric
evaluations).
28. 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Car. 1984).
29. B,s, 740 F.2d at 1115-22 (plurality opinion).
30. Id at 1161-73 (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
31. Id at 1104, 1106 (plurality opinion).
32. Id at 1107.
33. Id at 1106.
34. Id at 1107.
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ence.3s Based in part on this admission, the psychologist determined that Byers
was sane at the time of the offense.36 The trial judge called the testimony"devas-
tating," and the prosecution referred to it as the "critical thing" in the case."
The jury found Byers guilty of second degree murder, and Byers appealed in part
on the ground that his counsel should have been permitted to attend the psychi-
atric examination."s
B. Detemrnig a Critical Stage
As already noted above, the right to counsel attaches at a "critical stage" of
the proceedings." Judge Scalia took a restrictive view of a critical stage, whereas
Judge Bazelon adopted a broader view of the term.4 Judge Scalia believed that
a defendant only confronted a critical stage when directly faced with a profes-
sional adversary or the adversarial system in the form of a specific legal choice.41
Judge Bazelon believed that a defendant also confronted a critical stage when
physically present at a pretrial proceeding in which the defendant requires
counsel to act as an observer.
42
1. Judge Sada's View
Judge Scalia believed that the actual psychiatric examination of the defen-
dant did not constitute a critical stage.43 He acknowledged, however, that
language in the prior Supreme Court holding UnitadStates v Wade" indicated that
the psychiatric evaluation might be a critical stage.45 In Wade, the Court held that
an identification lineup, conducted at the police station, was a critical stage of the
proceedings, at which the right to counsel must attach.46  The Wade Court
distinguished the post-indictment lineup from other procedures that were not
critical stages, such as fingerprinting, blood and hair sampling, and analyzing the
accused's clothing.47 The Court reasoned that the details of those scientific tests
35. B)ems, 740 F.2d at 1108 (plurality opinion).
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id at 1108-09.
39. Wade; 388 U.S. at 224.
40. ConpmBen,740 F.2d at 1118 (pluralityopinion), uithBye, 740 F.2d at 1163 (Bazelon,
J., dissenting).
41. Id at 1118 (pluralityopinion).
42. Id at 1163 (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
43. Id at 1121-22 (plurality opinion).
44. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
45. BHes, 740 F.2d at 1116 (plurality opinion); Wade, 388 U.S. at 226.
46. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (finding that "the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the
prosecution," at which the right to counsel attached).
47. Id at 227-28.
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were readilyreconstructable at trial because the variations between them were so
slight.4" In contrast, the lineup was subject to a variety of subtle influences that
could unfairly impact the result; these influences would go unrecorded, effec-
tively preventing the defendant from ever challenging them in court during
cross-examination.4" Such influences may include a high level of suggestion in
the manner in which the State presented the accused to the witness."0 Moreover,
if the procedure was unfairlysuggestive, no one maynotice or report the unfair-
ness.5 ' The witness maybe reluctant to abandon the identification, the victim
may be too upset after the crime to notice or report any procedural unfairness,
and the defendant may be naturally too anxious to notice if the procedure was
unfairlysuggestive s2 The unwillingness or inabilityof those present at the lineup
to reveal anyinproprieties would deprive the accused of any chance to bring the
unfairness to light during cross-examination at trial.5 3 Therefore, counsel must
be present to observe the proceedings, otherwise any improprieties in the
process would be lost, and the accused would be effectively deprived of the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses at trial.'4 In summarizing Wade, Judge Scalia
said, "The language of that opinion seemed to suggest that counsel had to be
permitted to attend pretrial proceedings in which the existence of unfairness and
inaccuracy could not otherwise be detected and challenged at trial." 5
Judge Scalia believed, however, that interpretation of Wade was no longer
the controlling precedent for determining a critical stage. 6 In United States v
Ash, 7 the Supreme Court held that:
Although Wade did discuss possibilities for suggestion and the
difficulty for reconstructing suggestivity, ts discussion oc-
curred only after the Court had concluded that the lineup
constitted a trial-like confrontation, requiring the Assistance
of Counsel' to preserve the adversaryprocess bycompensating
for advantages of the prosecuting autorities5
48. Id
49. Id at 231-32.
50. Id at 229.
51. l at 229-31.
52. Wad-, 388 U.S. at 230-31.
53. Id at 231-32.
54. Id at 236-37.
55. B,n, 740 F.2d at 1116 (plurality opinion).
56. Idat 1117.
57. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
58. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973) (holding that for the right to counsel
to attach, the defendant must be confronted "bythe procedural system, or byhis expert adversary,
or by both").
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The Court decided that "as the initial criterion of Sixth Amendment applicability,
the accused must find himself 'confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural
system, or byhis expert adversary, or by both.'" 9 Ash concerned a witness's
identification based on a photo display, instead of an actual post-indictment
lineup of the kind considered in Wade." Because the defendant neither faced his
professional adversary nor the procedural system at the photograph identifica-
tion lineup, the Court determined that the right to counsel did not attach.6'
ThereforeJudge Scalia believed that a critical stage occurred when the defendant
was confronted
either with the need to make a decision requiring distinctively
legal advice- which may occur even in a context in which the
prosecutor or his agents are not present- or with the need to
defend himself against the direct onslaught of the
prosecutor- which mayrequire some skills that are not distinc-
tively legal.
62
Under Judge Scalia's reasoning, a critical stage only occurred when the accused
confronted either the legal system, in the form of some distinctively legal choice,
or a professional adversary personally.63
2. Jue Bazdn's View
Judge Bazelon did not viewAsh as completely repudiating the holding from
Wade, which required counsel's presence when necessary to ensure that the
intricacies, and potential inequities, of a pretrial procedure would not be lost by
a distracted defendant.' Rather, he stated that:
Asb does, however, construe Wade as conferring a right to the
assistance of counsel when the accused is subject to an encoun-
ter with the state that presents the possibilit of suggestive
influence which the accused will be unable to articulate at trial."
Therefore, Judge Bazelon believed that Ash granted the accused the right to
counsel at a pretrial event at which the accused was actuallypresent and needed
59. Beis, 740 F.2dat 1117-18 (plurafityopiion) (quotingAsh, 413 U.S. at 310). The Court
made numerous references to this concept inAsh. "Since the accused himself is not present... no
possibility arises that the accused might be misled byhis lackof familiafitywith the law or overpow-
ered byhis professional adversary" Ash, 413 U.S. at 317. To determine if the right to counsel was
required the Court looked to whether "the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or
assistance in meeting his adversary." Id at 313.
60. Ash, 413 U.S. at 301.
61. Id at 317,321.
62. B)em, 740 F.2d at 1118 (plurality opinion).
63. Id
64. Id at 1162 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
65. Id at 1162-63; seeAsh, 413 U.S. at 312-13 (summarizing the concern in Wadethat the
accused would not be an adequate observer of potential prejudice at pretrial events).
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to observe carefullythe proceedings to guard against prejudice." In short, Judge
Bazelon believed that A sh was distinguishable from Wade and Byers's case based
on the accused's actual presence at the event.
67
Judge Scalia found Judge Bazelon's reading of Ash baffling.8 Judge Scalia
noted that:
The dissent does not exlain why it is important to have coun-
sel present "to remedy de defendant's comparative disadvan-
tage as an observer," when the defendant himself is present at
the unrecorded event but not important to have counsel pres-
ent to remedy the defendant's absolute disadvantage as an
observer when he is not present, as in Ash.
69
A logical response to Judge Scalia's question would be that, as a rule, events at
which defendants are not present, e.g. physicaltestings and photographic lineups,
are events conducted according to well-established principles and therefore may
be easily reproducible. In contrast, events at which the accused is physically
present often involve considerably more human interaction, with greater atten-
dant possibilities of prejudice and influence. Hence, Judge Scalia's puzzlement
over why the defendant should have counsel to act as an observer at pretrial
events where the defendant himself is present but not at events where he is
absent actually points to a sound reason for recognizing the right to counsel at
psychiatric evaluations.70
Additionally, Judge Bazelon believed that the standard inAsh was no longer
controlling due to the Supreme Court's decision in Unated State v He"!'1 In
Henry, the Court held that the defendant faced a critical stage of the proceedings
when federal agents told one of the defendant's cell mates to listen for any
incriminating statements that the defendant made concerning a bankrobberybut
not to initiate any conversations." Judge Bazelon thought that Hemy amounted
to a step back from the Court's earlier formulation of a critical stage in Ash. 73
Judge Bazelon believed that the situation satisfied neither prong of the Ash
confrontation test because the jailhouse snitch was not a professional adversary
and the defendant was not faced with a situation in which legal advice was
66. B)en, 740 FId at 1163 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 1162 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 1117 n.13 (plurality opinion).
69. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Seeid (expressing puzzlement overJudge Bazelon's understanding of a critical stage after
Ash).
71. Id at 1163 (Bazelon, J., dissening); see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 266, 274
(1980) (finding that the government violated the accused's right to counsel by eliciting statements
from him through a jailhouse informant).
72. Hmr.% 447 U.S. at 266,274.
73. Byw, 740 F.2d at 1163 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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necessary to negotiate the criminal justice system.7 4 Indeed, the dissenting
opinion of then-Justice Rehnquist indicated that he agreed that Heniy marked a
departure from the Ash formulation of a critical stage." Therefore, Judge
Bazelon concluded that Hemy extended the definition of a critical stage beyond
instances in which a defendant is confronted by the legal system or a profes-
sional adversary. 6
Judge Scalia responded that the Court's decision in Hemy did indeed fall
within the rule of Ash Judge Scalia recalled that the informer in Hermy would
only be paid if he garnered an incriminating statement.78 Judge Scalia noted that
the Court found that, regardless of whether the government agent asked the
informer to solicit incriminating statements, the agent must have known it was
likelythe informant would solicit information.79 The Court stated that" 'confine-
ment maybring into playsubtle influences that will make [the defendant] particu-
larlysusceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents.' "o Therefore,
Judge Scalia concluded that the defendant in Henry was actuallyconfronted with
the adversarial system because a lawyer "would have been of assistance in
detecting and resisting tricks to elicit testimony not required by law, just as a
lawyer would have been of assistance in Wade in detecting and resisting sugges-
tive influences."'" Additionally, Judge Scalia found that the defendant's interac-
tions with the paid government informer certainlyconstituted a direct confronta-
tion with the prosecution. 2
In defending his position that Hemy actually fell within the rubric of Ash,
Judge Scalia mayhave inadvertentlylost the greater argument that the psychiatric
evaluation does not fall into the rule of Ash for determining a critical stage. A
psychiatric evaluation will probablynever fit into Judge Scalia's conception of a
confrontation with the system of justice because there are no strategic decisions
to be made during the interview unless counsel mayadvise the defendant to not
answer questions. 3 However, if a conversation with the jailhouse informer
74. Id at 1163-64 (BazelonJ., dissenting).
75. SwHry, 447 U.S. at 294-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (restating the Asb formulation,
and finding that the majoritytook "an overly broad view of the stages after the commencement of
formal criminal proceedings that should be viewed as 'critical' for purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment").
76. B)m, 740 F.2d at 1164 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
77. Id at 1118 n.15 (plurality opinion).
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id (alteration in origina) (quoting Hay, 447 U.S. at 274).
81. Id
82. Bem, 740 F.2d at 1118 n.15 (plurality opinion).
83. Se, WASH REV. CODE ANN. S 10.77.020(3) (West 2002) (stating that a defendant need
not answer the psychiatrist's question if the defendant believes the response maybe incriminating);
Shephard v. Bowe, 442 P.2d 238, 241 (Or. 1968) (implying that defense counsel may direct the
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constitutes "a direct onslaught of the prosecutor," then the formalinterviewwith
the psychologist might also amount to such a confrontation. " In his dissent,
Judge Bazelon noted that such psychologists could indeed be the adversary of
the defendant because they are paid by the State, their reports are given to the
government and often used to build the case against the defendant, and they
frequentlytestifyagainst the accused at trial."5 Therefore, if common confronta-
tions with jailhouse snitches amount to a confrontation with the professional
adversary, then so might the highly formal, and often devastating, interviewwith
the State's psychologist. 6 In Ash, the Court noted that one reason for the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel was to
remedy the disparity between the professional prosecutor and the relatively
unskilled layperson. 7 Such a disparity of expertise and training exists between
the criminal defendant and the highlytrained psychologist. Clearly, this disparity
is much greater than whatever disparity (if any) exists between the defendant and
ajailhouse informant. Therefore, if a meeting between a jailhouse informant and
the defendant represents a confrontation with the accused's professional adver-
sary, then the psychiatric examination must also be a confrontation with the
accused's professional adversary.
C Wl4etra C at-- rdedPsydxatwEwluat& is a Critical Stage
Certainlyan accused would have the right to counsel at a psychiatric evalua-
tion if Judge Bazelon's view of a critical stage after Ash is correct. However,
Judge Bazelon also argued that even underJudge Scalia's more restrictive defini-
tion of a critical stage, the right to counsel would attach at such an examination.88
First, as noted above, Judge Bazelon believed that the psychiatrists conducting
such evaluations are the professional adversaries of the accused.89 Moreover,
Judge Bazelon believed that the Supreme Court's holding in Sith removed any
defendant not to answer a question during the psychiatric evaluation).
84. Bvs, 740 F.2d at 1118 n.15 (plurality opinion).
85. Id at 1164 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
86. S& Sni h, 451 U.S. at 459-60 (illustrating just how damaging a psychologist's testimony
maybe); Byms, 740 Fid at 1106-08 (plurality opinion) (same).
87. Ash,413 U.S. at 308-09 (observing that "an additional motivation for the American rule
[of the right to counsel] was a desire to minimize imbalance in the adversary system that otherwise
resulted with the creation of a professional prosecuting official").
88. B)es, 740 F.2d at 1164 (BazelonJ., dissenting). Several states have found that the court-
ordered psychiatric evaluation is a "critical stage," albeit in slightly different contexts. S&, eg,
Hcstvr, 602 P.2d at 795 (finding that the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of the right to assistance
of counsel required counsel's presence at psychiatric evaluations); Le, 267 N.E.2d at 459 (finding
that in New York, the psychiatric examination constituted a critical stage, albeit before Ash was
decided).
89. B)Ems, 740 F.2d at 1164 (Bazelon, J., dissnting; sw s"pra note 85 and accompanying text
(discussing why psychologists are the professional adversaries of the accused).
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doubt about the issue.' Because the Court in Snitb found that the examination
by Dr. Grigson was a critical stage, Judge Bazelon reasoned that a necessary
corollaryto the Court's holding was that the examination was a confrontation.9
Judge Bazelon also quoted language in Snith dealing with the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights stating that during the examination, the accused" 'assuredly
was faced with a phase of the adversary system and was not in the presence of
[a] perso[n] acting solely in his interest.' "92
Judge Scalia argued that the psychiatrist was not a professional or expert
adversaryin anysense9 In particular, he foundJudge Bazelon's reliance on the
portion of Snith concerning the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to be
misplaced.94 First, Judge Scalia noted that before stating the language relied on
by Judge Bazelon, the Srnth Court found that:
"When Dr. Grigson went beyond simplyreporting to the court
on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at
the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future
dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like
that of an agent of the State." "
Therefore, Judge Scalia found that when taken as a whole, the language quoted
by judge Bazelon only established that the role of the psychiatrist evolved into
one similar to a State agent when he testified against the accused.96 Judge Scalia
believed that this implied that the psychiatrist was in fact not the defendant's
expert adversaryduring the examination.97 MoreoverJudge Scalia noted that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment questions were different and even if the Court did
believe the psychiatrist was the defendant's professional adversary for Fifth
Amendment purposes, it did not necessarily mean the same thing for Sixth
Amendment purposes." In the Fifth Amendment context, to determine if the
accused was faced with a professional adversary, the Court looked to see if the
examination was sufficiently "custodial" to require that the accused be warned
of his right against self-incrimination." In so deciding, the Court did not look
90. Bjes, 740 F.2d at 1164 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
91. Id (citing Sni, 451 U.S. at 467).
92. Id at 1165 (BazelonJ., dissenting) (alterations inorginal) (quoting Snrb, 451 U.S. at 467)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id at 1119 (plurality opinion).
94. Idat 1119-20.
95. Id (quoting Sn, 451 U.S. at 467).
96. Bp , 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion).
97. Id
98. Id; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person "sha l be compelled in anycriminal
case to be a witness against himself"); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting each person the right "to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense").
99. B! s, 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
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to see if the proceedings had reached a "critical stage."1te Judge Scalia reasoned
that if the accused was faced with a professional adversary for the purposes of
determining a critical stage, then the Sixth Amendment section of Snrth surely
would have been decided on those grounds, and indeed it would have necessi-
tated the result that the accused had the right to have counsel physicallypresent
at the examination, a result specifically disclaimed by the Court.'
Judge Bazelon rebutted Judge Scalia's argument that the psychiatrist was not
an agent of the State during the interview, but only later became such an agent
when electing to testifyfor the prosecution." He reasoned that manywitnesses
for the State, such as prosecutors and police officers, are neutral upon interview-
ing a defendant and only later become hostile upon the results of those inter-
views.'0 3 Judge Bazelon believed that it would unduly weaken the right to
counsel to withhold protection from the accused during interviews with agents
of the State who may become hostile at a later stage."° He found it paradoxical
to deny the defendant the right to counsel at a time when the case is often at its
most critical stage but then to grant that protection later on when the State
agents have officially become the defendant's adversaries."
Judge Bazelon's rebuttal is strengthened bythe fact that Judge Scalia based
his arguments not on what the Supreme Court in Snitb did decide, but rather
upon what the Court chose not to decide.1" When a court declines to decide an
issue before it, or chooses to decide the issue on different grounds, the ensuing
decision can hardly be said to be dispositive of the issue. Therefore, to the
extent that Judge Scalia rested his counter to Judge Bazelon's arguments on the
grounds of what the Supreme Court did not decide, he rested his arguments on
weak precedential ground.'
D. The Inpaww q'te Pmmii
Although S nith arose from an evaluation ultimately utilized bythe State to
prove future dangerousness, the question of whether defense counsel mayattend
(1966) (stating that a defendant must be advised of his right against self-incrimination before he
offers a statement that the prosecution may use at triaD.
100. Bym, 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion) (citing Snit, 451 U.S. at 1120).
101. Id; seeSrtib, 451 U.S. at 470 n14 (stating that the issue of whether the defendant had a
right to have counsel present at a psychiatric evaluation was not before the Court and that the Court
offered no opinion on it at that time).




106. Id at 1120 (pluralityopinion).
107. See id (resting the counter to the dissent on what the Snith Court did not decide and how
it could have more efficiently reached its decision).
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court-ordered psychiatric evaluations more frequently has arisen from evalua-
tions to determine whether the defendant was insane at the time of the
offense.08 In Byens, the defendant contended that his counsel should have been
present at evaluations to determine "his mental state at the time of the crime. " "
Neither Judge Scalia nor Judge Bazelon appeared troubled by that difference
betweenBjers and Snrh.1 " NonethelessJudge Scalia noted that the "importance
of the matter involved" was a factor in the Snit Court's determination that the
decision of whether to submit to the interview was a critical stage. 1 ' Therefore,
the importance of the proceeding may have an impact on determining whether
it is a critical stage.
The Court in Snith was concerned with both the importance of the exami-
nation and the element of surprise to which the accused was subjected.1 The
element of surprise will usually not play a role in either an examination directed
towards sentencing concerns or to determine insanity at the time of the offense
because most courts can only order such examinations when the defendant first
broaches one of those issues.113 Therefore, the element of surprise, present in
Smith, will not be a factor in such examinations. The relative importance of an
examination directed toward sentencing issues and an examination to determine
insanity at the time of the crime can vary from case to case. In the non-capital
108. See, eg,A lbn t, 388 F.2d at 721 (noting that the purpose of the psychiatric examination
was to determine defendant's mental state at the time of the crime); Houston, 602 P.2d at 786 (same);
Shadeart, 858 P.2d at 644 (same); Lw, 267 N.E.2d at 453 (same); Martr 950 S.W.2d at 21 (same);
se ifia Part VI (discussing whether defendant's right to counsel includes counsel's attendance at
competency evaluations, examinations directed towards sentencing concerns, and post-trial
examinations).
109. Bjew, 740 F.2d at 1116.
110. Judge Scalia noted that Snith involved an assessment of future dangerousness but treated
the rule and dictum from that case as applying to all court-ordered psychiatric evaluations. Id at
1119 (plurality opinion). Judge Bazelon found "no relevant distinction between defendants who
plead insanity and those who do not." Id at 1164-65 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
Ill. Iad at 1119.
112. See Snith, 451 U.S. at 470-71 (stating that the decision of whether to submit to the
examination meant the difference between life and death and that "[d]efense counsel, however, were
not notified in advance that the psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of their client's
future dangerousness").
113. See, eg, MiC-L COMP. LAYs ANN. 5 768.20a (West 2000) (providing that the court will
not order a psychiatric evaluation to determine insanity unless the defendant files a notice of intent
to raise a defense of insanity); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168.1 (Michie 2000) (allowing the trial judge
to order a psychiatric examination of the defendant at the Commonwealth's request when the
defendant has filed a notice of intent to relyon an insanity defense); VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1
(Michie 2003) (stating that a trial judge mayorder the defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation,
the results of which the Commonwealth may use during the sentencing phase, if the defendant has
filed a notice of intent to rely on expert testimony during sentencing). Virginia also provides for
a similar procedure when the defense notifies the Commonwealth it intends to produce expert
testimony of mental retardation. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2 (Michie Supp. 2003).
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context, an evaluation directed at sentencing considerations may not carry the
import of an examination to determine insanity. An examination to determine
insanity will directly impact the court's finding of guilt or innocence, while the
sentencing examination will only affect the court's selection of a sentence within
the relevant guidelines. However, in the capital context, an examination directed
towards sentencing is at least as, if not more, important than an evaluation to
determine insanity because the results of the first examination may mean the
difference between life and death in the sentencing phase. Although neither
Judge Bazelon or Scalia addressed the argument, in the capital context at least,
the importance of both examinations provides a strong reason for deeming each
a "critical stage."114
E. Pdicy A rgW mts
In addition to debating vigorously the Constitutional dimensions of the
question, Judges Scalia and Bazelon also explored the policy benefits and draw-
backs of allowing defense counsel to observe psychiatric evaluations.' Judge
Scalia discussed the potential distractions counsel might cause in a court-ordered
evaluation and the overall negative impact such distractions would have on the
process." 6 Judge Bazelon examined the prejudice a defendant would face if
forced to submit to a court-ordered examination without counsel present." 7
1. The Negiw Inrac jfC d o the Psd'aticEluatin
Judge Scalia noted that in deciding Sixth Amendment issues, practical
consequences should be given some consideration."' Judge Scalia believed that
the procedural system of law that would follow defense counsel into the exami-
nation was "evidently antithetical to psychiatric examination, a process informal
and unstructured bydesign."" 9 Even if defense counsel were to remain entirely
silent, and fill a completely observational capacity, Judge Scalia believed that
defense counsel's presence would provide a distraction for the accused. 2 ' This
114. Bjes, 740 F.2d at 1119 (plurality opinion) (recognizing that the importance of the
proceeding was a factor in the Court's decision in Sni, but failing to explore the importance of
the underlying proceeding in Byers' case); Id at 1164-65 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (discussing Sni
but not the underlying importance of the proceeding involved).
115. Id at 1120-21 (pluralityopinion); Id at 1165-70 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
116. Id at 1120-21 (pluralityopinion).
117. Id at 1165-70 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
118. Id at 1120 (plurality opinion); se Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (bolstering its finding that the
right to counsel attached to post- indictment lineups because "[n]o substantial countervailing policy
considerations have been advanced against the requirement of the presence of counsel").
119. Bjen, 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion).
120. Id Judge Bazelon countered that a videotaped procedure could just as effectively serve
the need for effectively reconstructing the examination at trial without interjecting a distracting
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distraction would undulyhamper the psychiatric evaluation.' MoreoverJudge
Scalia believed that such a purely observational role would bear no resemblance
to the traditional functions of counsel in adversarial proceedings.
12
1
2. Pbssible Prejdqice to the Deferdant Resulngfta the A bsenxe f C el at the
Ps~SadcEt duation
Judge Bazelon acknowledged that the Court in Srnrh based its Sixth Amend-
nent findings on the theory that counsel was necessary to protect the defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."' However, he noted
that in making that finding, the Court relied heavily on prior cases that held, in
essence, that a defendant must have counsel present at a pretrial confrontation
when the lack thereof "could seriously and irreparably prejudice his basic
rights."'24 In particular, Judge Bazelon discussed the Supreme Court's reliance
on Wade.'25 He sunmarized how Wade, as discussed above, required counsel's
presence at post-indictment lineups to notice any suggestive and potentially
prejudicial subtleties that the nervous and distracted accused might not be able
to recall at trial. 6
Judge Bazelon believed that the psychiatric interview was similar to the
post-indictment lineup in Wade and therefore, the presence of counsel was
necessary to record the event and ensure a fair cross-examination at trial."7
influence into the diagnostic process. At at 1171-72 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Scalia re-
sponded that "[riecording psychiatric interviews may be a good idea, but not all good ideas have
been embodied in the Constitution in general or the Sixth Amendment in particular." Id at 1121
(plurality opinion). Other states have solved this dilemma by allowing the defense's psychiatric
evaluators to be present during the evaluation, but not counsel Sa eg, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S
504.080(5) (Michie 1999) (stating that "[a] psychologist or psychiatrist retained by the defendant
shall be permitted to participate in any examination under this chapter "); Whido 210 A.2d at 775
(stating that if the prosecution examines the defendant, then "defense experts may be present").
121. B)en, 740 F.2d at 1120 (pluralityopinion). A number of jurisdictions have adopted this
view. See, eg, A0i4t, 388 F.2d at 726 (finding that "the presence of a third party, in a legal and
non- medical capacity, would severely limit the efficacy of the examination"); Ex pareMain, 628
So. 2d 421,422 (Ala. 1993) ("The presence of counselor anythir, partymayobstructa psychologi-
cal evaluation."); MaJvy 651 N.E.2d at 1064 (recogni7ing valid diagnostic reasons for refusing
to permit counsel to be present during a psychiatric exam"); Man* 950 S.W.2d at 26 (noting other
courts' concern that defense counsel's presence"would impede or inhibit the examination").
122. Byes, 740 F.2d at 1120 (pluralityopinion). Judge Scalia restated how, in his opinion, such
a purely observational role for counsel would be inconsistent withAsh's formulation of the proper
role for defense counsel Id at 1121.
123. Id at 1165 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (citing Snii , 451 U.S. at 465-66).
124. Id at 1166 (citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 272-73; Wade 388 U.S. at 221).
125. Id
126. Id at 1166-67 (Bazelon, J., dissenting); sw supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text
(discussing Wade).
127. Bjw, 740 F.2d at 1167 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 16:2
2004] RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS 437
Although Judge Bazelon noted the uncertainty inherent to the behavioral sci-
ences and the widely differing views of its practitioners, he focused on the
difficulties in reconstructing potential distortions of the interview at trial.' In
the clinical interview, the examining expert observes the accused's behaviors,
focuses on some of the behaviors the accused exhibits, and draws conclusions
from those behaviors. 29 A skillful advocate, he hypothesized, could learn what
exact behaviors the expert rested his or her conclusions upon and then challenge
the expert's conceptual framework13 However, an expert would never be able
to remember all of the facts from an interview."' The expert's presuppositions
and theoretical viewpoints might well lead the expert to disregard some facts,
unimportant to that expert but critical to another, or the expert's own human
frailty might have led the expert to omit facts from the testimony 32 Addition-
ally, Judge Bazelon feared that an expert might actually shape the accused's
behavior by asking certain questions, engaging the defendant on one response
but not another, or affecting the accused through the interviewer's passive
characteristics.' The accused could not be counted on to recognize and re-
member these subtleties.'34 Therefore, Judge Bazelon concluded that unless
counsel were present to observe the dynamics of the interview, its nuances
would go unrecorded and the defendant would be deprived of a chance to cross-
examine meaningfully the psychiatrist at trial, in clear violation of the Sixth
Amendment.
35
F. Caxiovrm Abot Byers
Although Judge Scalia carried the day in Byers, his arguments have not
necessarily held up better in the long run. Judge Scalia's characterization of a
critical stage is unduly restrictive, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's
holdings in Hey and Srrith.136 Although he acknowledged that the importance
128. Id at 1167-68. The uncertainty of behavioral science and the diversity of views therein,
Judge Bazelon believed, could be effectively cross-examined at trial Id at 1168.
129. Id at 1168.
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id at 1168-69 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
133. Bym, 740 F.2d at 1169-70.
134. Id at 1170.
135. Id at 1170-71. A number of other states that permit the presence of defense counsel
during the evaluation have pointed to this consideration as a reason for their decision. See, eg,
Huston, 602 P.2d at 795-96 (pointing to the importance of preserving the right of cross-examina-
tion as a reason to allow defense counsel to attend psydsiatric evaluations); Lee, 267 N.E.2d at 459
(same); seaso U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that the accused has the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him").
136. See B!s, 740 F.2d at 1163-65 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Court's
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of a pretrial stage could contribute to it being deemed "critical," he did not
consider the tremendous importance a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation
carries, particularly in the capital context. "7 Additionally, Judge Scalia failed to
respond adequately to Judge Bazelon's contention that a critical stage afterAsh
also included events at which the defendant was physicallypresent and placed in
a position where he could be subject to prejudice but unable to notice or recall
it due to the natural stress of an encounter with the criminal justice systen. 3 '
Judge Scalia's vague concern about the "procedural system of law" following the
attorney into the interview and somehow disrupting the examination pales next
to Judge Bazelon's detailed description of the subtle prejudice a defendant may
suffer during a psychiatric examination.'39
Therefore, Virginia should adopt a rule requiring defense counsel's presence
at psychiatric evaluations. While the constitutional issue behind whether a
psychiatric evaluation constitutes a critical stage is a close one, it appears that the
conclusion that the psychiatric evaluation is a critical stage is the slightlystronger
view. Nonetheless, the opposing view carries the weight of two present United
States Supreme Court Justices, and most courts that have recentlyconsidered the
issue have found that the defendant does not have a right to have defense
counsel present at a psychiatric evaluation.14 Moreover, the courts that decided
that the psychiatric evaluation is a critical stage did so before the Supreme
Court's decision inAsh and the D.C Circuit's decision in B~es.'41 Of course, the
determinations of a critical stage in Snitbh and Hey cast doubt on Judge Scalia's formulation of a
critical stage).
137. Swid at 1119 (puralityopinion) (recognizing that the importance of the underlying stage
of the proceedings was a factor in the Snith Court's rationale, but failing to examine the importance
of a court-ordered psychiatric examination).
138. Judge Scalia found that Judge Bazelon's distinction of Byers's case from Ash produced
a conundrum in which defendants could have counsel to serve a recording function at events at
which theywere present but not at events from which theywere absent. Id at 1117 n.13 (plurality
opinion). Nonetheless, sound policy reasons support that distinction. Sir sup part IH.B2
(discussing why defendants should logically have the right to counsel at events where they are
present but not at events which they do not attend).
139. SwB en, 740 F.2d at 1120-21 (plurality opinion) (arguing that the" 'procedural system'
of the law" mayfollowdefense counsel into the examination and therebydisrupt it); Id at 1168-69
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (listing potential prejudices defendants may suffer at court-ordered
psychiatric evaluations in counsel's absence).
140. Bye, 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion); sesuqra note 27 (listing jurisdictions that have
found that defendants have no absolute right to counsel at psychiatric evaluations).
141. SeE, eg, Hoston 602 P.2d at 794-96 (finding in 1979 that the Alaska Constitution's
guarantee that criminal defendants will enjoythe right to effective assistance of counsel implied that
defendants have the right to have their counselpresent at psychiatric evaluations); Li, 267 N.E.2d
at 459 (holding in 1971 that defense counsel should be present at psychiatric evaluations in order
to preserve the defendant's right to counsel and cross-examine adverse witnesses); SI phair 442
P.2d at 241 (implying in 1968 that defense counsel may be present at a court-ordered psychiatric
evaluation).
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determination that the psychiatric evaluation is not a critical stage does not mean
that counsel will automatically be excluded from attending. Even if no absolute
right to attend exists, many states vest the decision in the trial court's discretion,
and counsel should seek to persuade the trial court of the inportance of their
presence at the evaluation, perhaps through the policy arguments advanced by
Judge Bazelon' 42
On the other hand, several state legislatures have mandated that defense
counsel should be present at psychiatric evaluations.'43 Perhaps the most
promising way to establish a rule entitling a defendant to counsel during a
psychiatric evaluation in Virginia may be through legislation. In the legislative
context, Judge Scalia's argument that a pretrial examination is not a critical stage
would carry less weight. Unlike the courts, the legislature could require the
presence of defense counsel at pretrial psychiatric evaluations without finding it
was a constitutional right. Therefore, the inquiry into whether the examination
was a critical stage would be irrelevant in the legislative context. Moreover, the
sound policyconcems behind allowing defense counsel such access would apply
with the same force as in the judicial context. While the legislature still might be
concerned that the presence of counsel would unduly disrupt the examination,
the legislature could follow the example of other states and specifically instruct
counsel to remain an observer, allow counsel to view the examination through
an unrecorded live audio feed, permit a defense expert to attend the examination
in place of counsel, or take some other measure to avoid negativelyimpacting the
examination.'"
IV. WboMayBePresen
A lawyer's presence at the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation will help
ensure that the defendant's right to examine meaningfully an adverse witness is
preserved. However, a lawyer is not an expert in the techniques of psychiatric
examination, and the lawyer may not notice some subtleties that a psychiatric
142. Matin, 192 N.W.2d at 226 (finding that defendant had no absolute right to have counsel
present at psychiatric evaluation, but committing the matter to the trial court's discretion); Wlidoz4
210 A.2d at 776 (same).
143. ALA. R. QIM. P. 16.2(b)(8) (stating that when the court orders a psychiatric evaluation
"[t]he defendant shall be entitled to the presence of counsel at the taling of such evidence"); FLA.
R. QuM P. 3.216(d) (permitting attorneys for the state and the accused to attend a court-ordered
psychiatric evaluation); KY. REv. ST. ANN.§ 504.080(5) (Michie 1999) ("A psychologist or psychia-
trist retained by the defendant shall be permitted to participate in any examination under this
chapter."); N.Y. uM. PROC_ LAW 5250.10(3) (McKinney 2002) (granting "[diefendant [the] right
to have his counsel present at [a court- ordered] examination"); WASH REV. CODE S 10.77.020(3)
(2003) (allowing the defendant to have counsel physically present at a psychiatric evaluation).
144. See Q12dozq 210 A.2d at 775 (stating that if the prosecution examines the defendant, then
"defense experts may be present"); s ai, Part V (discussing alternatives to the actual presence of
defense counsel at the psychiatric evaluation).
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expert might observe. 4 In Peop/e v (wa146 the defendants argued that under
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 250.10(3) they were entitled to have
their psychiatric experts available at their pretrial examinations.' 47 The section
the defendants cited was essentially a codification of the New York Court of
Appeals's holding in Lee v Cam Coa .'48 In Lee, the Court of Appeals held that
defense counsel, as well as the prosecution, could be present at a psychiatric
evaluation.'49
The court in Ceasar rejected the defendants' arguments for a number of
reasons."' First, the court noted that the purpose of section 250.10(3) was to
ensure that no detail during the examination, potentially prejudicial to the
accused, would go unrecorded. 5' Towards that end, the statute explicitlystated
that" 'the role of each counsel at such examination is that of an observer, and
neither counsel shall take an active role at the examination.' ",152 The court
supposed that the defendants sought to have their experts present at the evalua-
tions to enhance their respective defense teams' critique of the State psychia-
trists' methodology.'53 Because the defense alreadypossessed an ample opportu-
nityto scrutinize the State's psychiatrists' methodologyon cross-examination, the
court determined that a further aid to the critique was not necessary.'54 More-
over, the court noted that the statute did not explicitly grant defense experts
admittance to such psychiatric evaluations.' However, the similar New York
statute governing pretrial competency hearings did specifically provide for the
admittance of such experts.'56 Finally, the court noted that other New York
145. Se People v. Ceasar, 727 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (noting that "the
presence of the defense psychiatrist is in all likelihood designed to facilitate critique of the prosecu-
tion's psychiatrist's examination methodology").
146. 727 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
147. Casar, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 259; see N.Y. GUM. PROC LAW S 250.10(3) (MKinney 2002)
(allowing for defense counsel's presence at pretrial examinations). In Cmar, the court consolidated
two similar claims from two different defendants. Cesar, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
148. Se Lae, 267 N.E.2d at 459 (finding a pretrial examination was a "critical stage" at which
the defendant had a right to have counsel present); N.Y. QUM. PROC LAW S 250.10(3) (granting
"[d]efendant [the] right to have his counsel present at (a court-ordered] examination"); N.Y. GUM.
PROC LAW S 250.10(3), practice commentary (stating that the legislature modeled the provisions
of S 250.10(3) on Le).
149. L e, 267 N.E.2d at 459 (stating that defendant may have his counsel present at a court-
ordered psychiatric evaluation to secure the right to cross-examination, the district attorneymayalso
attend, and that both attorneys may only observe the proceedings).
150. Caar, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 259-61.
151. Id at 259-60.
152. Id at 259 (quoting N.Y. QuM. PROC S 250.10(3)).
153. Id at 260.
154. Id
155. Id at 259.
156. Casar, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 259 n.1; see N.Y. CRIM PROC S 730.20 (McKinney 1995)
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courts had repeatedly declined to extend the reach of defendant's rights to
counsel and recording at court-ordered psychiatric evaluations beyond the
contours specified bythe legislature. 7
Requests to have mental health experts available at court-ordered psychia-
tric evaluations will likely meet with responses similar to Caisar. Many of the
complexities that could influence the results of a psychiatric evaluation, as set
forth byJudge Bazelon in his dissent in B) , maybe most readily noticed bya
mental health expert instead of the lawyer or the actual defendant.'58 Nonethe-
less, such a rationale might actually cut against the reasoning behind permitting
the presence of defense counsel at psychiatric evaluations in the first place. If
the mental health expert is actuallymore effective at noticing improprieties in the
examining process than the attorney, why require the attomey's presence at all?
The court could just grant admittance to the expert. Indeed, this economy of
persons present in the examining room would be compelling to many courts
given the concern they have expressed over the presence of extra people in the
examination."5 9 Therefore, while the presence of defense experts could be
beneficial to the defendant at the evaluation, it is likelythat the jurisdictions that
allow defense counsel to be present at psychiatric evaluations will decline to
extend that access to mental health experts. Conversely, some jurisdictions
which do not require courts to admit defense counsel to psychiatric evaluations
may require a court to admit a defense expert to the examination.' In either
event, it appears that courts are concerned with keeping the examination room
uncrowded and will thus limit the number of representatives allowed to attend.
(authorizing a defense expert's attendance at a pretrial competency evaluation).
157. Car,; 727 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61; sePeople v. Santana, 600 N.E.2d 201,204 (N.Y. 1992)
(finding that because S 250.10(4) does not expressly guarantee the defendant the right to have an
evaluation taped, the trial court did not err by refusing to order the examination taped); People v.
Kindt, 700 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (N.Y. Co. Cc. 1999) (denying the State's request to attend the
psychiatric examination of the defendant by the defendant's expert). Nonetheless, New York and
some other states allow the defendant to have a defense expert present at pretrial competency
hearings. Se N.Y. CrIMPROC LAW S 730.20(1) (allowing a defendant's psychiatric expert to attend
a pretrial competency evaluation); KY. REV. ST. ANN. S 504.080(5) (Mlchie 1999) (stating "[a]
psychologist or psychiatrist retained bythe defendant shall be permitted to participate in" a pretrial
competency hearing). Brtsee KY. REV. ST. ANN. S 504.070 (ichie 1999) (containing no reference
to whether defense counsel or expert may attend a pretrial psychiatric evaluation to determine
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime).
158. B)m, 740 F.2d at 1167-70 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
159. See Mani 950 S.W.2d at 26 (noting that several courts have expressed concern that
defense counsel's presence would impair or inhibit the evaluation); Malifey, 651 N.E.2d at 1064
(recognizing valid diagnostic reasons to deny defense counsel's request to be present at examina-
tion).
160. See Wbtou4 210 A.2d at 775 (stating that if the prosecution examines the defendant, then
"defense experts may be present").
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V. Vaerap4
An alternative to the actual presence of defense counsel at a psychiatric
evaluation would be the creation of a videotape. 16  However, a number of
strategic concerns must be taken into account when determining the desirability
of creating a videotape. The videotape should create an accurate record of the
proceedings that would assist in preserving the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to cross-examine meaningfully the State's witness. The videotape could
make the cross-examination more effective if shown to the defense expert before
trial because it would give the expert a chance to scrutinize the State psychia-
trist's methodologyfor anyprejudicial subtleties. On the contrary, depending on
the defendant's demeanor during the interview, the tape could create a piece of
evidence that would be devastating to an insanity defense if shown to the jury.
Many defendants have sought to have a videotape of their psychiatric
evaluation created. 6 2 Jurisdictions that have found a defendant has a right to
counsel during the psychiatric evaluation seem to be willing to require an elec-
tronic recording of the interview, whereas jurisdictions that believe no such right
exists typicallydo not require a recording. 163 Nonetheless, almost everycourt to
consider the issue has acknowledged that recording the proceedings is a "good
idea" and that the trial court should either be allowed or required to order the
recording.'" Those courts generallyfound that the recording would increase the
reliability of the trial bycreating a complete and accurate record of the psychiat-
ric interview.
16
Such tapes could prove to be invaluable evidence. In a jurisdiction in which
the attorney is not allowed to attend the psychiatric evaluation, the tapes will
enable the attorney to subject the State's expert's methodology to rigorous
161. See Bys, 740 F.2d at 1172-73 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (proposing that evidence from a
court- ordered psychiatric evaluation should only be admissible if defense counsel were present at
the evaluation or were provided with a complete recording of the proceedings).
162. Sir, eg, id at 1121 (plurality opinion) (responding to appellant's contention that the trial
court should have granted the request to have the court-ordered examination videotaped); Homon
602 P.2d at 796 (same); Main 950 S.W.2d at 27 (same); Badrein, 686 N.E.2d at 1005 (same).
163. Hoton, 602 P.2d at 796 (noting that videotaping "offers a potentiallyadequate alternative
to the physical presence of defense counsel during the psychiatric interview"); B)vs, 740 F.2d at
1121 (plurality opinion) (admitting that videotaping "maybe a good idea," but deciding that "not
all good ideas have been embodied in the Constitution"); Mayn, 950 S.W.2d at 27 (finding that
recording of the interview is not constitutionally required but may contribute to the fairness of the
trial and should therefore be left within the discretion of the trial court); Badr* 686 N.E.2d at
1005-06 (same).
164. SwB)s, 740 F.2d at 1121 (plurality opinion) (admitting that recording the interviewmay
be a "good idea"); Ba/d u 686 N.E.2d at 1005-06 (same); Manin, 950 S.W.2d at 27 (same).
165. Se eg,Manin, 950 S.W.2d at27 (statingthat "recordingthe psychiatricexamination[may
be a] simple and effective means to preserve evidence and to enhance the accuracy and reliability
of the truth-seeking function of the trial"); Ba/dmiu 686 N.E.2d at 1005-06 (noting the beneficial
effects of recording the evaluation).
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scrutiny. Moreover, it will also give the defense's experts an opportunity to do
the same. Because most courts recognize the tapes' inherent value in furthering
the truth seeking goal of trials, a defendant should be able to convince the trial
court to allow taping in most cases.'
However, not all defendants wish to have the interview taped. Some,
perhaps fearful that their demeanor during the interview will contradict an
insanity defense, worry about putting such evidence into the Government's
hands because the Government would likely present it to the jury to refute the
insanitydefense. Before submitting to an examination byGovernment experts,
the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski ("Kaczynski"), opposed the creation of
a videotape of the examination. The government argued that "videotaping is
the best means of capturing the defendant's nonverbal communications; it also
preserves a verbatim record and shortens the time necessary for the examina-
tion."168 The defense countered that the process of videotaping the interview
would be unnecessarily intrusive and that the aims the Government sought to
secure byproducing a videotape could be just as easily achieved through the use
of audiotaping.169 The Government conceded that no medical reason justified
videotaping over audiotaping."' Therefore, the court decided that the govern-
ment could only audiotape the proceedings and must provide a copy of any
recording to the defense.17' Interestingly, the court also ordered the prosecution
to provide the defense with a live audio feed to the examination and, if re-
quested, a live video feed."
The court's decision in Yaayrzki illustrates some potential alternatives to
the difficult choice between taping the interview, with the corresponding risk of
creating prejudicial evidence, and not taping the interview, and therebybeing less
able to effectively expose improprieties in the examiner's methodology. A
defendant concerned about submitting to such an interview could follow
Kaczynski's path and request that an audiotape be produced instead of a video-
tape. This method would be less prejudicial, and a court maybe inclined to grant
the request because there appears to be little medical reason to prefer one
recording to the other."3 Additionally, the defendant could seek to have a live,
but unrecorded, video feed sent to defense counsel's team. This result would
166. See s"pra note 163 (listing courts that have supported videotaping the court-ordered
psychiatric examination).
167. UnitedStates v. Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1997WL 668395, at *3-*4 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 22, 1997).
168. Id at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id at *3-*4.
170. Id at *4.
171. Id
172. Id at *4 n.5.
173. Kaayzk 1997 WL 668395, at *4.
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allowthe entire defense team, attorneys and experts, to view the proceedings for
biases on the part of the examiner without disturbing the process of the inter-
view.174 It would also have the effect of not creating any new evidence prejudi-
cial to the accused's insanity defense.
Ultimatelythe strategic decision concerning whether to seek a recording of
the examination boils down to the defendant's personality. If the risk that the
defendant's demeanor on the video will undermine the insanitydefense is great,
then counsel maywish to avoid the creation of the video. In that case, defense
counsel should consider an alternative to the videotaping, possibly an audiotape
with an unrecorded live video feed. Otherwise, the defense should try to con-
vince the court to order the interview recorded because the tape will provide the
attorneys and the experts with an opportunity to analyze fully the adversarial
expert's methodology. Virginia should not adopt a provision either specifically
forbidding or requiring videorecordings. Although most courts support them,
one or both parties might be inclined to oppose the creation of the recording.
175
Thus, Virginia should vest the matter in the trial court's discretion. However,
Virginia should allow defense experts to viewthe proceedings along with defense
counsel through a live video feed or from behind a one way mirror to best
protect the defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses effectively.
176
VL arPsoaEuatim
Generally, the question of whether a defendant may have counsel present
at a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation arises in the context of an evaluation
conducted by the State experts to assess the defendant's insanity defense.
However, defense counsel may also seek admittance to other mental health
interviews, such as competency evaluations, examinations directed towards
sentencing considerations, and post-trial examinations. States have taken a
174. The net effect of this arrangement produces the same result as an arrangement adopted
by one New York court that required defense counsel to observe the evaluation from behind a one
waymirror. People v. Whitfield, 411 N.Y.S.2d 104,104-05 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1978). In Byen, however,
Judge Scalia claimed that this arrangement would still detract from the evaluation because, even if
defense counsel were out of the room while watching the proceedings, "the subject's attention
would still wander where his eyes could not." Bs-s, 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion).
175. SeB)ms, 740 F.2d at 1121(admitting that videotaping maybe a "good idea" but deciding
that "not all good ideas have been embodied in the Constitution"); Howst 602 P.2d at 796 (noting
that videotaping "offers a potentially adequate alternative to the physical presence of defense
counsel during the psychiatric interview")Ada&h 686 N.E.2d at 1005-06 (finding that recording
of the interview is not constitutionally required but may contribute to the fairness of the trial and
should therefore be left within the discretion of the trial court); Mann, 950 S.W.2d at 27 (same).
Butsee~Kaayki, 1997 WL 668395, at *3 *4 (stating that the defendant opposed the creation of the
videotape).
176. See supra Part IV (discussing the advantages accrued when defense experts, as well as
counsel, are able to view the court-ordered examination).
[Vol. 16:2
20041 RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS 445
variety of approaches towards dealing with defense counsel's presence at these
examinations.
A. Pmt" Ca rexy Exani zt
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 730.20(1) governs defense
counsel's presence at competency evaluations, and explicitly states that "the
court may authorize a psychiatrist or psychologist retained by the defendant to
be present at such examination."'" The statute's use of the word m-y implies
that this power is discretionary to the trial court."8 In contrast, the Kentucky
statute governing this situation provides that the expert s/aU be permitted to
attend.*7 9 While both statutes allowthe defense's mental health expert to attend,
both are silent as to whether defense counsel mayalso attend.' The reasoning
in Ciaar, discussed above, might provide some guidance to this situation."8'
Because the court held that mental health experts could not attend the psychiat-
ic evaluation of the defendant's insanity due to the statute's silence on the
subject, it might follow that defense counsel may not be able to attend the
competency examination in light of the statute's silence on that point.'82 Ken-
tuckyaddressed a verysimilar question inJacA v Camawuat. 13 Injacd , the
defendant was evaluated for competency over a two month period at a state
institution, but during that time the court did not appoint the defendant a mental
health expert." 4 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the defendant was not
prejudiced because, among other reasons, defense counsel were present for a
substantial portion of the evaluation.' Therefore, given the decision inJacai,
there is a possibilitythat the Kentuckystatute maybe read to grant the defendant
177. N.Y. QIM. PROC LAW S 730.20(1) (McKinney 1995).
178. Sw id (stating that the court "mtrj authorize defense psychiatric experts to attend a
pretrial hearing to determine competency).
179. See Ky. REV. ST. ANN. S 504.080(5) (Michie 1999) ("A psychologist or psychiatrist
retained bythe defendant shall be permitted to participate in anyexamination under this chapter.").
180. S& id (allowing "[a] psychologist or psychiatrist retained bythe defendant" to be present
at a court-ordered evaluation, but not defense counseD; N.Y. CM PROC LAW S 730.20(1) (same).
181. S&- Cavar, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (declining to allow the defense's mental health experts to
attend a court-ordered examination to determine mental state at the time of the offense in light of
the statute's silence on that topic).
182. Sw id at 259-61 (noting that because there was no common law discovery in criminal
cases, the court was constrained to the explicit legislative mandate in that area).
183. SeeJacobs v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 435,439-40 (Ky. 2001) (findlng that defendant's
statutory right to have his mental health expert present at a pretrial competency hearing was not
violated when "defense arxmd were present" during the examination but the expert was not).
184. Id at 439; see KY. REv. ST. ANN. S 504.080(5) (providing for the presence of defense
experts at a competency evaluation).
185. jaw&, 58 S.W.3d at 440.
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the right to have either his attorney or mental health expert available at a pretrial
competency hearing.
B. Exariuicr Diredat Seonng Conideration
As noted above, in Snith, the Court specifically reserved ruling on whether
defense counsel should be present at a court-ordered psychiatric examination,
the results of which could be used bythe State to persuade the juryto impose a
death sentence during the penaltyphase of the trial." 6 A number of other courts
cited that dictum in cases that arose from an examination to determine sanity at
the time of the offense."' Nonethless, some states have considered separately
the question of whether defense counsel may attend a court-ordered psychiatric
examination, the results of which will be used during sentencing. For example,
in Florida, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202(d) provides that if the State
notifies the defendant of its intent to seek the death penalty and the defense
informs the State that it will use mental health evidence in mitigation, the court
will order an evaluation within 48 hours after conviction.8 ' The examination will
determine what impact the defendant's mental state should have on sentenc-
ing."89 Attorneys forthe defendant and the State maybe present at this examina-
tion.90 In contrast, Texas does not provide the accused with the right to have
defense counsel present at such evaluations.' In Benmw v Stae,192 another case
involving Dr. Grigson's appraisal of a defendant's future dangerousness at the
sentencing phase of trial, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that "[i]t is
axiomatic that defendants do not possess the right to have counsel present
during a psychiatric examination under the Fifth or Sixth Amendment."'93
186. Snr&, 451 U.S. at 471 n.14.
187. See, eg, B)em, 740 F.2d at 1119 (plurality opinion) (relying on Snith to denythe defendant
the right to have counsel at a court-ordered examination to determine sanity at the time of the
offense); Marin, 950 S.W.2d at 25 (same).
188. See FLA. 1R. Qum. P. 3.202(d) (stating that "[a]ttomeys for the state and defendant may
be present at the examination" conducted bythe State's experts in response to defendant's intention
to present mitigating mental health evidence during a capital sentencing proceeding); see aso FLA
. CRIM. P. 3.216(d) (permitting attorneys for the State and accused to attend a court-ordered
psychiatric evaluation in response to defendant's intent to raise an insanity defense at trial.
189. FLA. R ,QtIM.P. 3.202(d). The rule states that "[tlhe examination shaU be limited to those
mitigating circumstances the defendant expects to establish through expert testimony." Id
190. Id
191. Bennett v. State, 766 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Tex. Grim. App. 1989).
192. 766 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
193. BvMt, 766 S.W.2d at 231. The dissentpointed out that Dr. Grigsonearned the moniker
"Dr. Death" for the efficacy and frequency of his practice of testifying for the State during the
sentencing phase of trial. Id at 231 (Teague, J., dissenting).
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Florida also allows the Governor to order an evaluation of a person sen-
tenced to death who may be insane in order to avoid executing an insane
inmate. 194 The statute specifically provides for the presence of defense counsel
at the evaluation.19 Alabama, however, in Ex pate Martin,9' decided that an
inmate under the death sentence in that state does not have any right to the
presence of counsel at a post-trial examination to determine insanity.' The
Alabama court noted that the Alabama statute governing such proceedings,
unlike the Florida statute, contained no provision requiring the actual presence
of the inmate's counsel at the evaluation."' Moreover, the court declined to find
that the defendant had a constitutional right to counsel's presence at the evalua-
tion, in part, because of the potential negative impact an attorney's presence may
have on the psychiatric evaluation.'99 Therefore, the matter was left within the
discretion of the trial court on a case by case basis.2t
D. Cbndxzo/z
States that grant the defendant the right to counsel at some psychiatric
evaluations should grant defendants that right at all such examinations. The
policy concerns identified byJudge Bazelon in B~ems weigh no less heavilyin the
context of an examination to determine competency, mitigating mental health
factors, or post-conviction insanity than they do in a pretrial evaluation of a
defendant's sanity. 1 The formats of all of these proceedings essentiallyinvolve
an interview between a mental health expert and the defendant. Consequently,
each is filled with opportunities for prejudicial nuances to go unnoticed if a
trained observer is not present to protect the rights of the accused. Because of
conscious and subconscious biases, the psychologist might only notice some
parts of the defendant's behavior. Such biases may also cause the psychologist
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 922.07(1) (West 2001).
195. See rd ("Counsel for the convicted person and the state attorney may be present at the
examination.").
196. 628 So. 2d 421 (Ala. 1993).
197. SeMari 628 So. 2d at 422-23 (finding that defense counsel did not need to be present
at a psychological examination conducted years after the inmate was sentenced to death).
198. Id at 422. Catpor ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1995) (allowing the trial court to stay the
execution if the defendant appears insane but not specifically requiring the presence of counsel at
anyevaluations the court mayorder to make that determination), uitbFLA. STAT. ANN. S 922.07(1)
(West 2001) (requiring the presence of an inmate's counsel at a psychiatric evaluation conducted
after the inmate was sentenced to death).
199. Mart* 628 So. 2d at 422-23 (citing B)e, 740 F.2d at 1120 (plurality opinion)).
200. Id (noting that neither the Constitution nor the Alabama statute granted the defendant
the right to have counsel present at a court-ordered evaluation).
201. Be,s, 740 F.2d at 1167-70, (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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to steer the exam in a certain direction or pursue one issue over another. There-
fore, states that find the defendant has an absolute right to have defense counsel,
or a defense expert, present at one such evaluation should find that the right
extends to all similar evaluations.
VII. A dnissibiiy d 'fEiden fmw t Etlbuation
In B)m, Judge Scalia held, in a different part of the opinion:
When a defendant raises the defense of insanity, he mayconsti-
tutionally be subjected to compulsory examination by court-
appointed or government psychiatrists without the necessityof
recording; anZ when he introduces into evidence psychiitric
testimony to support his insanity defense, testimony of those
examining psychiatrists may be received (on that issue) as
well,
20 2
Judge Scalia noted that this was the majorityview. 23 Indeed, the Supreme Court
later adopted this view in Budwmn v KenYt y.2 4 The Court went on to reaffirm
its holding in Snith that a defendant must be given a chance to consult meaning-
fully with counsel before deciding to submit to a psychiatric evaluation."'
Therefore, it appears that evidence from the psychiatric evaluation maybe used
to rebut the defendant's claim of insanity, provided that defense counsel are
aware of that possibility when advising the client whether to submit to the
examination. Indeed, some state statutory schemes specify that the State may
only subject the defendant to a psychiatric examination after the defense notifies
the State of its intent to raise an insanity defense.2"
Virginia limits the Commonwealth's abilityto subject the accused to psychi-
atric examinations and enter evidence gleaned from those examinations at trial
In Virginia, the Commonwealth cannot subject the accused to a psychiatric
examination to determine aggravating and mitigating factors, mental retardation,
or sanity at the time of the offense, unless the defense first notifies the Com-
202. Id at 1115.
203. Id at 1111.
204. SeeBuchananv. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402,423-24 (1987) (finding that the use of the report
generated by the pretrial psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of rebutting defendant's insanity
defense was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment).
205. Id at 424-25 (finding that the case was not governed bythe rule in Sni because counsel
had full knowledge that the evidence could be used against the defendant at trial).
206. See eg, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-3993(A) (West 2001) (allowing the prosecution to
have a number of its own psychiatric experts, equal to those available to the defense, evaluate the
defendant after the defense first announces its intent to raise an insanity defense); MI-. COMP.
LA'WS ANN. S 768.20a (West 2000) (stating that a court will only force the defendant to undergo a
psychiatric examination if the defense notifies the court that it will rely on an insanity defense at
trial; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (1995) (conditioning a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation on the
defendant filing a notice of intent to rely on the insanitydefense).
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monwealth that it intends to present expert testimony towards any of those
issues." 7 Moreover, the Commonwealth will not be able to use any evidence
gained fromthis examination, or anysimilar psychiatric examination, at sentenc-
ing, except to rebut a specific claim made by the defense.0 8 Therefore, in
Virginia, the accused will onlybe compelled to submit to a court-ordered psychi-
atric examination if the defense first places the mental condition of the accused
into question. Evidence from the examination will only be admitted for limited
purposes.209
VIII. 7he Rde fDefare Caaed Dunng the Enluatin
As a general rule, states that grant defendants the right to have defense
counsel attend psychiatric evaluations have delineated a passive role for the
attorney."' ° Such a role allows the attorney to observe the proceedings and
therebyprotect the accused's right to cross-examine an adverse witness at trial.2 '
Nonetheless, some jurisdictions provide a more active role for counsel present
at the psychiatric evaluation."' However, given the widespread belief that the
mere presence of counsel may seriously disrupt the psychiatric evaluation, most
courts would not likely allow defense counsel to take an active role.' Prevent-
207. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-168.1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (allowing the trial judge to order
a psychiatric examination of the defendant at the Commonwealth's request when the defendant has
filed a notice to rely on an insanity defense); VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3:1 (lichie Sup.2003)
(stating that a trial judge may order the defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, le results
of which the Commonwealth may use during the sentencing phase, if the defendant has filed a
notice of intent to rely on expert testimony during sentencing); VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1.2
(c Supp. 2003) (providing for a similar procedure when the defendant files a notice indicating
that the defendant will produce expert testimony of mental retardation).
208. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:3 (Mlcfhie 2003).
209. Id
210. Sw Houcn, 602 P.2d at 796 n.23 (mentioning that "for the most part, we believe the
defense counsel's role will be passive in nature"); Le 267 N.E.2d at 459 (finding "no merit to the
argument that defense counsel should be permitted to take an active role at the examination").
211. Le 267 N.E.2d at 459 (stating that both attorneys present at the psychiatric evaluation
should observe the proceedings but save their objections for tria]).
212. Se WASH REV. CODE ANN. S 10.77.020(3) (West 2002) (stating that a defendant need
not answer the psychiatrist's question if the defendant believes the response maybe incriminating);
Sbo=4 442 P.2d at 241 (implying that defense counsel maydirect the defendant not to answer a
question during the psychiatric evaluation).
213. SeeMani* 950 S.W.2d at 26 (noting that several courts have expressed concern that
defense counsel's presence would impair or inhibit the evaluation); Maha2f 651 N.E.2d at 1064
(recognizing valid diagnostic reasons to deny defense counsel's request to be present at the
examination); State v. Berryman, 796 N.E.2d 741,745-46 (nd. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the trial
court erred by allowing defense counsel to attend court-ordered examination when defense
counsel's avowed purpose in attending the examination was to instruct the defendant not to
cooperate).
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ing defense counsel from actively engaging in the examination would allow the
attorneyto observe improprieties in the examination process while minimizing
any negative impact on the evaluation itself.
IX. Condxion
Some of the questions posed at the beginning of this article can be an-
swered with relative ease, others remain unclear. Certainly, no defendant should
have to decide whether to submit to a psychiatric evaluation without the benefit
of counsel.214 Whether the defendant should have a right to have counsel
present has proven to be a closer question. The majority view among courts
appears to be that the defendant has no such right. However, courts and jurists
who have found otherwise have advanced considerable policy reasons and
cogent constitutional arguments to support the right to counsel at court-ordered
examinations. In particular, Judge Bazelon's catalogue of potential prejudices an
accused may suffer during a psychological evaluation, which most defendants
will likely never notice, and hence never be able to challenge at trial, provides a
strong reason for guaranteeing the accused the presence of counsel during the
evaluation.215 Without counsel present to observe such inequities, an accused
may be subject to damaging prejudice, which in the capital context could be the
difference between life and death.216 Even if a court finds the accused has no
right to have counsel present at the examination, and is unwilling to allow
defense counsel to attend the psychiatric evaluation due to the potential disrup-
tion the attorney may cause, the court should consider some alternatives other
courts have implemented, such as a live video feed, a one waymirror, or allowing
a defense expert to attend, to avoid the potential prejudices noticed by Judge
Bazelon.
Some issues have a fairlyclear consensus among the states. Apparently, the
State may not force the defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation unless the
defendant files a notice of intent to relyon the insanitydefense. Moreover, most
states that allow defense counsel to attend some or all psychiatric evaluations
also require the attorney to fill a purely observatory role. However, other
attendant issues, such as whether anyone other than the defense attorneyshould
be allowed to view the proceedings and at which, if any, other examinations
defendant mayhave the right to counsel, have not produced a uniform response
among the states.
Finally, the question of videotaping remains a difficult choice for a criminal
defendant at a psychiatric evaluation. The tape mayprovide an adequate record
of the proceedings and provide the defense team with a valuable opportunityto
214. Srn , 451 U.S. at 471.
215. B~m, 740 F.2d at 1168-69 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
216. SeSrth, 451 U.S. at 459-60 (illustrating just how damaging a psychologist's testimony
may be); Boers, 750 F.2d at 1106-08 (plurality opinion) (same).
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expose any prejudice inherent in the manner in which the expert conducted the
interview. The tape may, depending on the defendant's demeanor, also become
a potentiallydamaging piece of evidence in the prosecution's arsenal. However,
given most appellate court's favorable reception of the idea that the evaluation
should be videotaped, most trial courts would probably grant a motion to
videotape the proceedings. Following the defense strategyin Kazzzki, a defen-
dant may oppose the creation of the videotape by urging the court to order the
production of an audiotape instead. A defendant proposing the creation of a
videorecording of the interview will probablybe successful, whereas a defendant
opposing the recording of the interview will likely be required to settle for a
minimally prejudicial audio recording.
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